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In contrast to the general absence of such
discussions in the West, the Muslim majority
world has witnessed intense debates over
the meaning and consequences of (particu-
larly cultural) globalization for the relation-
ship between 'Islam' and the 'West', even as
its economic markers such as rapid growth
in trade, the use of information technologies
to reorganize production, and the integra-
tion of financial markets, have had limited
i m p a c t . There exists a multitude of Arabic,
Turkish, Persian, French, German and Italian
language literature on the subject. Exam-
ined together, they reveal great ambiva-
lence towards possibilities and dangers that
globalization implies: that is, a general fear
that globalization has brought an 'invasion'
of American culture to Muslim societies that
will 'hollow us out from the inside and do-
mesticate our […] identity'; yet at the same
time an awareness that globalization is a
'natural' process – 'neither Hell nor Heaven' –
from which the Arab/Muslim world cannot
opt out.
Muslim experiences of globalization can
be interpreted as a 'post-modern cultural-
ism', one that is intimately connected to
what is arguably the culturalization of poli-
tics and economies as a defining moment of
contemporary globalization. In this dis-
course, many Arab and Muslim writers de-
mand 'the right to be different' as the basis
for the democracy necessary to negotiate
past the Scylla and Charybdis of assimilation
into or exile from the emerging global
order. This focus on the right to cultural dif-
ference is crucial, because globalization is
understood to be premised on the develop-
ment of a forced difference that leads to the
deepening of poverty and inequalities both
inside and between countries. 
The consensus seems to be that globaliza-
tion marks a continuation of the basic dy-
namic of Western domination and hegemo-
ny dating back hundreds of years, in which
today America is utilizing globalization to
overthrow existing political, economic, and
cultural norms. In this context, globaliza-
tion's cultural/ideological foundations pro-
vide it with the 'fine power' to realize its im-
perialist aims without causing classic revo-
lutionary reactions to it, as did Western im-
perialism before it. 
Building on two centuries of Muslim cri-
tiques of capitalism and materialism (from
Al-Jabarti to Sayyid Qutb and Ali Shariati)
contemporary writers see globalization as
sabotaging the 'Islamic Personality' and 'in-
fect[ing] the people', causing a 'planned ex-
change' with true Muslims through the in-
troduction of materialist culture. As the
cover of a recent popular book on the issue
depicts it (in the fashion of an old dime-
store novel), the American cowboy is lasso-
ing the world. Culture is considered central
to the power of contemporary globalization
because globalized culture leads people to
withdraw loyalty from their 'cultural nation-
al identity', leaving only equally powerful
discourses such as Islamism able to stand
against it. 
Moreover, equally important to the per-
ceived threat to democracy and autono-
mous development posed by American-
sponsored globalization is the fear that the
consumer/materialist culture at its heart will
tear down the borders erected and main-
tained by the nation-state. Yet at the same
time the fear for the future of the nation-
state raises the question of how central the
nation-state, and the 'human nationalism'
counterposed by one writer to an 'inhuman
globalism', serves its purpose in the 'global'
era, and in a situation where tens of millions
of Muslims now live in the heart of the West,
where the dar al-harb (i.e. non-Muslim coun-
tries) is gradually becoming dar al-Islam. 
Muslims in Europe
Indeed, these ambivalent sentiments to-
ward globalization are shared not just by
Middle Eastern Muslims, but by Muslims liv-
ing in Europe as well, although the latter
generally have a more sanguine perspec-
tive. Over the course of four decades of
Muslim (im)migration to Europe a diverse
community, some 10 million strong, has be-
come 'implanted' on European soil. The
emerging European Islam is situated in a tri-
angular relation with the wider European
host societies and Muslim majority coun-
tries of origin. Together these vectors pro-
duce two opposing tendencies: a Euro-Islam
that sees itself as a permanent presence in
the space of Europe, and a 'ghetto' Islam
that mirrors the continued rejection of Islam
by the white/Christian majority cultures. 
The latter tendency is fuelled by the same
processes of economic marginalization suf-
fered by most developing countries that
have undergone structural adjustment. This
dislocation has fuelled the 'Islamization of
identity' of many younger European Mus-
lims in the same manner that globalization
has 'ideologized' Islam across the Muslim
world. Thus may Muslim leaders in Europe
remain hostile to 'Western'/European cul-
ture; indeed, if anti-IMF violence in Egypt
and Algeria heralded the arrival of global-
ization in the MENA region in the late 1980s,
in 1990 an 'intifada of the cities' in France
broke out, waged largely by poor Muslim
immigrants; while in 1993 the Union of
French Islamic Organizations issued a mani-
festo which, in a language that resonates
with the critiques hailing from the Muslim
majority world, preached the need of 'free-
ing [people] from the yoke of ungodly capi-
talism […] fac[ing] the colonialist unbeliev-
er, the eternal enemy'.
Yet on the other hand, many Muslim lead-
ers in Europe, such as Rachid al-Ghannouchi
or Tariq Ramadan, see countries such as
France assuming the status of dar al-Islam,
that is, a 'Muslim' country. Islam i n France is
becoming an Islam o f France, a transforma-
tion that was crucial to the way in which
Muslims in Europe and around the world
perceive and relate to Europe. Indeed, the
question that is raised vis-à-vis these more
extreme Islamist imaginations of European
Islam is how France can be 'expelled […]
from the minds of the colonized' when the
(former) colonized are now living i n F r a n c e .
This is the European problematic generated
by the radical political reassertion of Islam in
Algeria, and in the southern Mediterranean
more generally. 
It is clear, then, that Islamism in Western
Europe is nurtured by the same systematic
processes which are found at the global
level. In a more positive sense, this situation
reveals the power of Islam as a transnational
identity which allows, for example, net-
works to be formed by small businesses and
associations in Germany and Turkey that
allow Turkish immigrants to benefit from
being political and social actors in both
countries. One could argue that the success
of these networks is an important reason
why, in contrast to the generally negative
(or at least suspicious) appraisal of global-
ization in the Arab world, the Turkish debate
is more evenly divided between those who
support and those who criticize the domi-
nant neo-liberal, consumerist model of
globalization. 
At the same time, it reveals the impor-
tance of class/economic position in deter-
mining religious expression of European
Muslims, in fostering and supporting a Mus-
lim élite capable of acquiring legitimacy in
both Europe and their country of origin, and
more broadly, in shaping the space of Eu-
rope and the Euro-Med region into a 'terre
de mediation' between Europe and the
Muslim world. More specifically, there is a
large and growing Muslim middle class,
supported through communities such as Fe-
tulleh Gulen that have developed a 'neo-lib-
eral Islamism' that challenges the hegemon-
ic Saudi (Wahhabi) Islam that has sought to
establish the kind of religious and cultural
homogenization in the Muslim world that
many critics decry as a damaging element of
the globalization discourses emanating
from the West/America. 
Whatever their motivations, it is clear that
many Arabs and Muslims are developing
their own cultural responses to globaliza-
tion through the introduction of a politi-
cized Islam into the modern arenas of social
life. Such cultural politics is generating 'new
One of the consequences of the post-11 September
war on terrorism has been the appearance of numer-
ous attempts, both in academia and in the press, to
explain 'Muslim rage', 'why they hate us', and 'what
we can do about it'. Much of the reporting has cor-
rectly focused on Western culture as a source of an-
tagonism in the Muslim world. However, few analy-
ses have focused on the role of globalization – and
the new matrices of cultural, economic and political
interaction it has produced – in perpetuating and
even exacerbating the hostility between segments of
Muslim and Western societies. 
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Muslim lifestyles and subjectivities' in the
global era – the most deleterious of which
are on display nightly on the TV news, the
more positive of which are harder to spot in
the media. Indeed, Muslim thinkers are not
shying from the issue of 'why the hatred of
America', as a recent Al-Hayat opinion piece
described it. For many, such 'repugnance'
and 'antipathy' towards the US are compa-
rable to the feelings of George Washington
toward the British; or at least an under-
standable response to 30% unemployment,
increasing poverty, and myriad other prob-
lems which most critics of globalization see
as the inevitable outcome of neo-liberal
economic globalization.
Strong opposition to American power and
'tyranny' is seen as a sentiment in common
with many European citizens, whose increas-
ing opposition to US policies is noted by
many authors. This reaching out to Euro-
peans demonstrates the potential to bring
Muslims and Arabs into the grassroots world-
wide conversation on globalization as an
important avenue to address many of the
problems that stifle its growth. Such a move
would expand the focus to include issues of
culture and identity that are the foundation
for shaping any alternative worldwide con-
versation by enlarging the conversation be-
yond its secular, left-wing base to include
both 'religious' and 'Other' perspectives.
Cultures of resistance
In the context of the post-11 September
war on terrorism, the current heightened vi-
olence between Palestinians and Israel has
exacerbated Muslim sentiments against the
United States and opened new space for
communication with European opponents
of American-sponsored globalization. In
fact, Israel has long been singled out, based
on the vision of leaders such as Shimon
Peres, as the 'engine' of globalization, and
thus a threat to Muslims regardless of the
status of the peace process with Palestini-
ans and its Arab neighbours.
The daily displays of unchallenged US and
Israeli power are strengthening the belief
that in the global era there can be no alter-
native for the Arab world except unity and
loyalty to its original culture. But how to re-
main loyal? A 'cultural revival' that can unify,
rather than divide, humanity is called for,
one built on a 'firmly rooted infrastructure' –
that is, Islam. Indeed, scholars and activists
around the world consider such 'revival' and
'protection' to be the foundation for suc-
cessful 'cultures of resistance' against the
negative effects of globalization. Yet more
broadly, a new 'universalism' is advocated,
one which would 'open up to the world', en-
riching rather than diluting or even erasing
local identities. In this vein, Islamist thinkers
and activists are developing specifically
Muslim models for a multicultural society
which need to be situated vis-à-vis the con-
struction of alternative modernities in other
cultures in the global era.
Thus Tariq Ramadan seeks to decentre
globalization from the West and deploy the
'effervescence of thinking and mobilizations
in the Muslim world' to make possible a
'South-North synergy'1; but to build on such
forward thinking the Muslim world must 're-
alize that there exist cleavages and resis-
tances that traverse national and cultural
frontiers and even the larger symbolic fron-
tiers between civilizations'. But to achieve
this, as Hassan Hanafi observes, a 'recon-
struction of the mass culture' in the Muslim
world is necessary, one that can reduce the
power of the main stream in favour of
heretofore marginalized voices that favour
human initiative and freedom.
To quote Muhammed Arkoun: 'The circu-
lation of various Islamist discourses will
have much to do with how this turns out',2
that is, with the success of the growing at-
tempts by Muslim and Western intellectuals
and culture producers alike to establish a
successful dialogue between their respec-
tive civilizations. Much research remains to
be done before we can assess the prospects
for this important enterprise.
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